Abstract-Social Internet-of-Things (SIoT) environment comprises not only smart devices but also the humans who interact with these IoT devices. The benefits of such system are overshadowed due to the cyber security issues. A novel approach is required to understand the security implication under such a dynamic environment while taking both the social and technical aspects into consideration. This paper addressed such challenges and proposed a 3-D security modeling platform that can capture and model the security requirements in the SIoT environment. The modeling process is graphical notation based and works as a security extension to the Business Process Model and Notation. Still, it utilizes the latest 3-D game technology; thus, the security extensions are generated through the third dimension. Consequently, the introduction of security extensions will not increase the complexity of the original SIoT scenario, while keeping all the key information on the same platform. Together with the proposed security ontology, these comprehensive security notations created a unique platform that aims at addressing the ever complicated security issues in the SIoT environment.
I. INTRODUCTION

W
ITH the recent technological advances, Internet of Things (IoT) will play an increasingly important role in our daily lives. Billions of small devices with the capability of computing and communications not only enable a new way of interactions between humans and smart things but also change our behaviors in the society, for example, through the social networks. These ubiquitous IoT devices are deeply embedded in our lives and eventually form a part of the social IoT (SIoT) environment [1] .
Like any existing IT systems, a paramount question needs to be answered by the SIoT as the security issue [2] . The ubiquitous nature of IoT implies that it is not just the digital contents on these devices facing the threat but humans' physical safety may be also in danger due to the blurred boundary between the digital and physical world. The changing social relationship between humans and things represents the main difference with the more complicated security implication. In such environments, the technical solution alone cannot properly address all the outstanding security concerns. The social aspect of the issue needs to be included into consideration [3] . Therefore, the sociotechnical challenges in terms of security need to be properly addressed before the implementation of SIoT.
Among the security issues, the very first one is always to identify and model the security requirements. In a dynamic environment like SIoT, devices may connect or leave the network without users' notice. The lack of central point brought the question of where the security policy should be defined and how they can be enforced. In this paper, we investigate a novel approach to create a security requirement modeling platform that could help to effectively capture and model the security requirements in the SIoT environment. We build the platform based on the Business Process Model and Notation (BPMN), which is comprehensive enough to represent both the humans and things as services in the same platform, and extend it with security requirements being captured in the third dimension. Similarly, the security requirements are managed separately without increasing the complexity of the original SIoT scenarios.
With a predefined security ontology [4] , a set of security notations that serve as an extension to the existing BPMN library can be created. Together, they can model an SIoT scenario and the security requirements in a two-step approach. The notations we created have taken Moody's "Physics of Notations" [5] into account, which are the first security notations to satisfy most of the design principles.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II introduces the background of using BPMN to model the SIoT scenario and the key concepts of the security ontology that we use. The current modeling approaches and benefits of using the third dimension are discussed in Section III. In Section IV, we address the design of our solution including the construct framework and notation visualization. Section V then details the development process of our platform. In Section VI, we provide a brief overview of the implemented platform, including a run through of how security notation is added to an existing SIoT diagram. The evaluation of the proposed security notations is provided in Section VII. Section VIII analyzes some existing BPMN security extensions identifying the notational issues within each one. Finally, Section IX provides the conclusion.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Use BPMN for SIoT Scenario Modeling
BPMN can be used to graphically represent the business processes and their component relationships in a common standard between organizations [6] , [7] . Apart from automatic 2329-924X © 2018 IEEE. Personal use is permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission.
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service tasks that can be used to represent smart things, BPMN provides the necessary social aspects such as the modeling of human tasks to demonstrate human activities. It allows capturing the interactions between humans and things in a single diagram. The Aniketo Project [8] has successfully utilized the BPMN platform to model a service-oriented environment incorporating both automatic services and manual user tasks. In [9] , we also demonstrated the possibility to use BPMN diagrams to represent the IoT environment. In general, if we see each IoT device as a service provider, they can be represented in the BPMN diagrams as a service task. The whole scenario can then be described as a set of linked tasks, which must be executed in a specific order, collectively resulting in an objective or policy goal being achieved. These tasks can even be conducted across one or multiple organizations [10] . BPMN fulfills the requirement of the visually representing process and is now the industry standard for business process modeling [11] . Nevertheless, even though security directly affects the functionality of these processes, BPMN has no support for specifying cyber security requirements [12] , [13] . As it will be explained in Section VIII, current BPMN security extensions have made attempts, but they are being constructed unsystematically, without any empirical evidence to support their choice of concepts [14] or notational design.
B. Cyber Security Ontology
As a prerequisite, an ontology of cyber security requirements within the SIoT environment should be created first [5] . This allows the ontological analysis to be conducted both throughout and after the creation of any BPMN security extension. The ontological analysis is a systematic process which prevents the issues such as construct deficit and ensures that all necessary concepts are included. The process involves the comparison of a modeling language and an ontology to establish a one-to-one mapping between the two, either through interpretation mapping or through representation mapping [5] . The ontology acts as a concept requirement list for the extension with the ontological analysis determining whether or not all requirements are met.
For the cyber security domain, such an ontology already exists. In our previous work, we presented an ontology of cyber security requirements that aims to act as a foundation for the creation of a comprehensive BPMN security extension [4] . Stressing that current extensions have been heavily a construct deficit and thereby failed to adequately provide a suitable tool for representing security requirements, we proposed a total of 79 cyber security requirements that should be modeled in BPMN before an extension can be deemed comprehensive. These are structured into six areas with a hierarchy depth of four. The six areas being: access control, privacy, availability, integrity, accountability, attack/harm detection and prevention, and availability. Full details of the ontology can be found in [4] .
With an ontology created, the next steps are to design and implement our solution. As mentioned, there are flaws with existing security extensions which are further elaborated in Section VIII. Throughout this paper, we explore the hypothesis that a third dimension could provide the potential solution to these issues. By the third dimension, we mean utilizing the 3-D game technology to turn the conventional 2-D-based BPMN diagrams into a 3-D environment, with an extra dimension being used to visually represent the security information. It will potentially help the users to understand and manage information more efficiently, especially in a complex scenario as explained later in Section III-B. We propose a novel solution that aims to be comprehensive to the ontology created by us and satisfy Moody's "Physics of Notations" [5] , which defines the principles a notational modeling language should stick with. We aim to use this ontology as a basis for our solution of the platform, ensuring that we are not only overcoming the notational issues but also providing the first truly comprehensive tool for modeling cyber security requirements within SIoT.
III. MODELING APPROACHES
A. Conventional Extension
Although there are many tools available for modeling (Visio, UML Designer, and Modelio), they are all very similar to functionality and user interaction. Take Microsoft Visio as an example [15] (Fig. 1) . The general user interface (UI) tends to include some form of workspace in the center of the screen. Typically on the left side of the UI, there will be a toolbar which includes the language constructs. These are usually presented as their diagrammatic visual representation along with accompanying textual names. These constructs can then be added to the diagram through either drag-and-drop or by first selecting a construct then clicking somewhere within the workspace to place it there; this functionality being dependent on the software.
There are some tools such as Activiti [16] , which also feature detailed bars along the bottom of the screen. These usually offer a more practical and familiar method of changing the construct text or unique identifiers through text input boxes.
During the development of a security extension, most authors typically expand on an already existing tool such as Visio. Most tools usually include some functionality for the creation or inclusion of custom notation. SecBPMN2 (see [11] ) utilizes Visio's Stencil functionality. This allows users to create a custom toolbar of their favorite symbols for future use. It also allows saving custom symbols as shown in Fig. 2 . As most security extensions are represented in a similar manner to that of BPMN, there has been little progress in terms of new modeling approaches. Most authors merely present a set of concepts and accompanying symbols, regardless of the fact that by adding more constructs, they have increased the language complexity and potentially nullified any complexity management the language had in place.
B. 2-D Versus 3-D
To address the issue of complexity management, we propose representing cyber security requirements across the third dimension.
Research into 3-D visualizations versus 2-D visualizations has already provided empirical evidence supporting the use of 3-D from an efficient and user preference point of view [17] . The use of 3-D in BPMN has also been investigated. The application created by Brown et al. [18] , however, does not feature any information across a third axis and merely provides a way of traversing or manipulating a 2-D diagram. The advantage of our approach is that the original SIoT scenario can remain relatively unaltered, being represented without change across two axes as shown in Fig. 3 (left).
Cyber security requirements can then be represented across x-, y-, and z-axes, as shown in Fig. 3 (right) . In such a way, cyber security requirements are being displayed at a similar abstraction level as BPMN while still maintaining a comprehensible diagram. The application of 3-D, however, provides its own issues such as interactivity and rotation techniques [19] . While there is no objective to solve the problem in this paper, it is worth noting what current or new means of interaction will be needed.
In [20] , our previous work tested the feasibility of this hypothesis with user experimentation. Participants were shown a simple BPMN diagram with several colored circles linking to BPMN-task elements. Participants were then given a set amount of time in which they had to identify what colors were linked to each task, noting their results through a paper-based questionnaire. The BPMN-task elements were assigned a number opposed to a business process, just as security was represented through colored circles and not explicit notation. The intention is to represent current cyber security extensions in an abstract complexity-focused manner and not to cause confusion or interference by including unnecessary business or security details.
From these experiments, it can be observed that for BPMN diagrams with a relatively low number of security notations (six constructs), 3-D provided no advantage in terms of read speed and accuracy. Most users prefer the 2-D approach over 3-D. However, when the complexity of the diagrams was increased (36 security constructs), 3-D provided a substantial improvement in read speed and accuracy compared to 2-D. More specifically, participants were able to read over 20% more of the 3-D diagram with over twice the accuracy compared to 2-D in the same amount of time.
IV. DESIGNING A 3-D BPMN SECURITY EXTENSION
With the recognition of encouraging results obtained from the experiments, the application of 3-D to BPMN demonstrates a lot of potentials for the representation of cyber security requirements. Before detailing the visualization of the language, however, there must first be a notation to extend with.
A. Notation-Visual Vocabulary
By using parts of the "Physics of Notations" [5] , we were able to create a graphical framework that can be used to create security constructs for every concept within our ontology [4] . 1) Perceptual Discriminability: When extending an existing language with a new domain, perceptual discriminability has two sides. The notation requires discriminability not only among its own constructs but also against that of the extended language, i.e., all notations representing IoT scenario are clearly distinguishable from security notations.
By representing security across the third dimension, BPMN and security notations will always be distinguishable first and foremost by whether or not they are across the x-/z-axes or the x-/y-/z-axes.
Second, if a consistent shape is to be used for all constructs, this means any distinguishing features must be encompassed within such a shape. A search on Google Images using the keyword "security" 1 returned two most popular icons associated with security that we considered to use as an outer shape in our design: padlock and shield. Fig. 4 shows that a padlock shape takes up roughly 40 squares. However, the inner design space allows only for 20 squares (in green), just 50% of the space the construct occupies. By comparison, the shield takes up 39 squares and allows for 23 full design spaces, i.e., 59% of the construct space. Therefore, in order to accommodate more discriminable features, we opted for a shield as the outer shape of our framework.
2) Semantic Transparency: The semantic transparency of the symbols will be achieved primarily through the creation of a unique icon. As the outer shape will be consistent [ Fig. 5(a) ], without anything inside the shield, there is no way to distinguish the constructs from each other. Therefore, each construct may include an icon specific to the concept it represents [ Fig. 5(d) ]. Using an icon design approach for symbols has been proved to increase usability, recognition, and familiarity [21] . Inevitably, every symbol requires some learning. However, using this approach will improve the semantic immediacy of the constructs given icons a natural goal of being a graphical mnemonic to their concept.
3) Visual Expressiveness: There are eight visual variables that can be used to construct a notation, these being: horizontal position, vertical position, shape, brightness, size, orientation, color, and texture [5] . We have already discussed how we have utilized shape, both as the outer shell of each construct and as the icons themselves.
We also utilized brightness within our notation as a way of inferring what hierarchy depth the symbol is at. The brighter the construct, the higher is the level [ Fig. 5(e) ]. However, as brightness is only a secondary notation, this hierarchy is reinforced with a more robust variable: shape. Fig. 5(b) and (e) shows how the peaks of each shield are slightly changed to reiterate this hierarchy. We also used size to show this distinction. The higher the concept level, the larger is the construct. However, given that small symbols are difficult to read the size difference is relatively small, we deemed it more practical to keep the symbols at a readable size rather than utilize this variable to its full potential.
As for color, this was used as a way of separating the six key areas as specified in our ontology [ Fig. 5(f) ].
1) Red = access control.
2) Orange = privacy.
3) Green = integrity. 4) Turquoise = accountability. 5) Blue = attack/harm detection and prevention. 6) Purple = availability. Again, color is only a secondary notation, so this distinction is also reiterated elsewhere. In Section V, we will discuss more about this.
Concentrating on just the notation design itself, the final variable used is orientation. As discussed earlier, security is always distinguishable by the fact it is perpendicular to the IoT diagram at a different orientation.
4) Dual Coding:
Given that this principle states that constructs should be accompanied by supporting text, we added the name of each construct within the symbol. From this, you can see how brightness is used to determine the individual hierarchy level, along with the peak count at the top of each shield. It also acts as a good example of how simply following the "Physics of Notations" beforehand can drastically improve principles such as perceptual discriminability and semantic transparency. We do not claim to be expert icon designers. Nevertheless, by using other variables such as shape, color, brightness, and dual coding, the level of distinction among the symbols is a lot higher than the majority of the previously assessed extensions.
B. Notation-Visual Grammar
Along with visual vocabulary (graphical symbols), a notation also requires Visual Grammar (compositional rules) [5] . For the proposed solution, we build from the 3-D examples in our experiment [20] . Each IoT element has its own unique holder capable of specifying any security requirements. However, representing 79 concepts at once on a single BPMN element will almost certainly cause cognitive overload and incur several complexity issues. Nevertheless, the incorporation of current BPMN functionality modularization [22] alongside 3-D will allow for a more manageable and, therefore, comprehensible diagram.
In order to find a solution, we plan to display six concepts at the highest level on each IoT element [ Fig. 7 (a)], with respect to the six key concepts identified by us [4] . These symbols will then act as individual buttons to modularize their subconcepts. Once a symbol is selected, the remaining five will collapse and the next level of concepts will be displayed . However, instead of collapsing the other symbols at lower levels, they will be hidden. This is to ensure that the complexity is still managed. Once collapsed, the symbols become unidentifiable anyway, and to hide them after the top level, it is ensured that it will not result in cognitive overload.
To further iterate the concept hierarchy on the top of brightness, shape, and size, we include another visual variable: vertical position. Once a symbol is selected, the subconcepts display at a decreased size, respectively, to the lowest level [ Fig. 7(d) ]. They also appear below the parent symbol giving the impression of a tree structure and that a lower vertical position indicates a lower concept level. However, when no symbol is selected, the six key concepts are displayed vertically as well. To ensure that the user does not infer a similar hierarchy, new links (lines) are used to connect parent and child concepts [ Fig. 7 (c) and (d)]. Along with the fact that the core six concepts also have different colors and the same size (not reduced sizes like their children), we are confident this issue will not arise. Nevertheless, we also color the links (lines) with respect to their core area to reiterate this relationship.
Along with vertical position, we also use the horizontal position. Unlike the majority of extensions (and modeling languages), our extension always places constructs in the exact same position relative to its associated IoT element explicitly. For example, if we number each of the red symbols in Fig. 7(d) , one-six, respectively, symbol six (bottom right) will always appear in the same position irrelevant of whether or not symbols four and five are specified. This effectively means that if every icon was exactly the same, as they all have a unique position, a user could still infer the construct from this alone.
Of the eight visual variables, our extension utilizes seven, dismissing only texture. Thereby, making our solution is one of the first to explore and utilize the full toolset at a modeling language disposal.
C. Modeling Tool Functionality
Given that our proposed solution will include 3-D visualization, navigation of the scene is a potentially problematic area [19] . Nevertheless, we propose using a similar method as that used in most 3-D games and game engines. Wherein, the user can "fly" a camera around the scene using WSAD keys and mouse input configuration [23] . However, this may not be all users' preferences, and some users will inevitably struggle to use this setup. Therefore, we will also include functionality to allow the user to align the camera to specific IoT and security elements with the push of a button.
One requirement to be considered is coherence. Existing extensions at times have a difference of opinion on what a concept is and thereby how it should be used. To overcome this issue, extensions would benefit from explicitly specifying concept meanings and consequently their use. To implement this into our solution, we included a details toolbar. This will allow the user to access various information about symbols which would, otherwise, be difficult to represent through a notation, such as the definition of a concept.
Where our ontology might be comprehensive to what a security notation should graphically represent, there is still room for more details to be specified. For example, representing the security requirement for the virtual private network in some cases may be adequate. However, there are more details that could specify on Layer Two Tunneling Protocol or Internet Key Exchange [24] . Providing the functionality to specify such details gives the modeler even more freedom to explicitly define their requirements. We represent such details as text in a toolbar opposed to a graphical symbol to ensure that graphic economy is maintained. When dropping to a level lower than the lowest of the ontology, the number of concepts hits an exponential increase. Take biometric as an example. If we were to include a graphical construct for each of biometric children concepts. The graphic complexity of the extension could increase by around five (iris, retina, facial, fingerprint, and voice) just from this one concept. Therefore, it is more appropriate to provide very specific detail as text instead.
D. Choice of Technology
When it comes to interactive digitally generated real-time 3-D scenes projected onto 2-D displays, the game technology provides a range of technologies that support and simplify the development of interactive visualization. Technical advancements in the game technology include rendering, realistic physics, lighting, audio, graphical UIs (GUIs), head-up displays, inputs, and scripting [25] . They are also able to serialize and deserialize XML files.
The majority of available engines offer relatively similar functionality. The main differences are licensing costs and final render quality. If making a realistic first-person shooter, for example, one of the best engines would be Unreal 4 [26] . However, taking into consideration what we require from an engine, we chose to work with Unity. 2 This is mainly due to Unity's functionality of being able to port to the majority of devices [27] . Although we have no immediate goal of developing on a platform beyond PC, this functionality is the most appealing to us in the long term when compared to what other engines offered. Unity is also a free software to download.
E. Application Framework
Here, a two-step approach is adopted to create the BPMN diagram and include security. The working process of the application is overviewed in Fig. 8 .
Although a crude overview, Fig. 8 provides a visual representation of the following.
1) Creating a BPMN-based IoT diagram.
2) Saving an XML file of the diagram.
3) Reading the diagram into Unity. 4) Adding security requirements to the diagram in Unity. 5) Saving an XML file of the security requirements. The BPMN-based XML file contains all the necessary data to redraw its respective IoT diagram within a game engine environment. Each IoT element is represented by a node within the file specifying the following details: element type, unique ID, height, width, x, and y. From this data, we can assign a 3-D model to each element respective to its element type. Then, using the width and height attributes rescale this model as required. The x-and y-coordinates, however, must be remapped within the game engine to the x-and z-axes, respectively. Where x and y are commonly used for 2-D, the third dimension (z) is used to add depth. Therefore, to make the diagram more readable and save awkward rotation within the engine, the coordinates need remapping (see Fig. 3 for more details).
As previously mentioned, we plan to draw each security construct in the exact same location relative to its parent IoT element. This not only makes for a better notation but also streamlines the development process. As demonstrated in Fig. 7 , it can be noticed that each IoT element has a gray line to indicate the linking of its security requirements; we call this as a holder. As each construct will be in the same location with respect to its IoT element, it will be also in the same location respective to this holder. As such, when adding security to each IoT element, we are not required to store any coordinates. We simply need to specify what the associated IoT element is. From this, we can get the coordinates of that element and do a simple calculation to determine the holder location (we assume y is 0/ground level) (Fig. 9 )
where x holder x-coordinate; x 2 IoT element x-coordinate; w width of IoT element; z holder z-coordinate; z 2 IoT element z-coordinate; o offset value from the top of the IoT element. The GUI for our application will be split into three areas: build, settings, and details. The build toolbar consists of all the functionalities required to add (and remove) security requirements to the IoT diagram. Settings as implied control various settings of the application, consisting of hiding/showing of security requirements, focusing on a specific IoT element or security symbol, and saving of the diagram itself. The details toolbar as previously discussed contains various concept specifics (definitions). Each area will be contained as shown in Fig. 10 .
This reflects the conventional layout of modeling tools (Section III) and should ensure a usable application through familiarity.
V. DEVELOPMENT OF A 3-D BPMN SECURITY EXTENSION
The implementation of our application can be split into three phases: planning, asset production, and development (Fig. 11) . 
A. Planning
The majority of the planning phase was covered earlier in Sections II-IV. Specifically, defining what concepts we plan to include within our notation; those being the security requirements specified in our ontology [4] .
As for the scope of supported IoT element, BPMN has a graphic complexity of 171 constructs [22] . As we are only testing a proposed extension not building industry-ready software, considering time constraints, we will only include support for a small portion of the BPMN notation. This being: pool, lane, start event, end event, message start event, message catch event, timer start event, error end event, terminate end event, parallel gateway, exclusive gateway, inclusive gateway, user task, business rule task, script task, receive task, and service task. Nevertheless, we are confident that we have included sufficient notation for the coverage of most general SIoT scenarios.
B. Asset Production
When using an object (security construct) more than once in a game engine, it is a good practice to assign a prefab to that object. This allows all instances of the object to be edited at the same time and for the object to be easily instantiated from code [27] . To develop a prefab of a security notation requires just two components: a 3-D plane and a diffuse texture. We apply the diffuse texture to the plane. Then, as long as the background of our diffuse texture is alpha, we can toggle the setting within Unity to read all alpha channels as transparency. This game object can then be set to act as a prefab for the respective construct, as shown in Fig. 12 .
The same process is also used to create the prefabs of supported IoT elements.
C. Development
The first stage of the development process was to render the IoT diagram. As each IoT element now has a designated prefab, we could use the method described previously to redraw the diagram. Fig. 13 shows a screenshot of a rendered IoT diagram within the game engine environment.
The next stage involved the parallel development of both visualizing security notation and functionality to add the security notation to each IoT element. Within the application, security constructs are specified as follows.
1) Highlighting an IoT element (clicking on it).
2) Adding a holder to the element (button press).
3) Choosing a respective security construct (button press). When a user assigns a security construct, rather than manually placing it like in other languages, the application performs some calculations and places the construct in a specific position relative to the IoT element and holder.
Section IV discussed how holders calculate their coordinates based on the associated IoT element. Each security construct has a similar relationship to its holder. From the holder coordinates, a security construct can use an equation respective to its position to calculate its own coordinates. For example, access control which is always at the top of the holder is calculated first by assigning the same coordinates as the holder. Then, translating the construct 400 units along the y-axis and slightly offsetting the x-coordinates to account for the symbol width (Fig. 14) . Similar equations are predefined within the application for every construct.
As for the modularization of security constructs, this was accomplished by assigning each construct its own family tree. Should access control be selected, any construct whose parent is access control will then display. Similarly, if a child construct is highlighted along with its own children displaying any siblings will collapse or hide depending on their level. The details toolbar is another core functionality within our application. As stated early, coherence is an issue most extensions suffer from. Therefore, to overcome this issue, we included a toolbar that shows the definition of the currently highlighted concept (Fig. 15) .
Along with the concept definition, the inclusion of lower level security detail is shown in Fig. 15 . For example, username required, password required, pin required, and password change period (weeks). As with the other security requirements in our extension, not all users will need or use such detail. Nevertheless, providing the functionality to specify this detail ensures an overall more comprehensive extension.
VI. EXAMPLE WALKTHROUGH
In order to explain how the application actually works, this section covers a more comprehensive walkthrough of adding security notation to an IoT diagram.
First, as a modeler you must decide on which IoT element you wish to add security to (all supported notations can specify security). Then, using the left mouse button select the element, as shown in Fig. 16 .
The application notifies the user that the IoT element is highlighted by placing an open-rectangle highlighter around it. It is also colored red to further iterate this. The next step is to add a holder to the element. This is accomplished by pressing the respective button in the build toolbar, as shown in Fig. 17 . Once an IoT element has a holder, the application will give the user access to the six key concepts as identified in [4] . (Until a holder is added, this functionality is disabled.) The user then simply needs to add their choice of construct by pressing the respective button. These buttons are located under the build menu and can be seen in Fig. 17 (left) .
However, this only works for the key six concepts. If the user wishes to add a concept of a lower level, they must first select the parent construct by pressing it with the left mouse button. This will then change the set of constructs in the build menu to the children of the highlighted construct. Take access control as an example parent. If we highlight this construct, the security requirements in the build menu will change from the core six to authentication, identification, and authorization. This is another way of managing the complexity of the application along with the usability and speed at which a modeler can specify their requirements. When familiar with the notation hierarchy, a modeler will be able to quickly add their requirements by selecting parent and child constructs. Compared with traditional methods of long scrollable lists of constructs, our approach is much more manageable.
When selecting a parent symbol, the other symbols on the same level are either collapsed or hidden. An example of this can be seen in Fig. 18 .
In this example, the highlighted concept is authentication, located inside the red box shown in Fig. 18(b) . As the parent must also be highlighted (access control), the remaining concepts in the key six will collapse [ Fig. 18(a) ] [refer to the element in Fig. 18(a) (right) for an example of the key six not collapsed]. We will also be able to see by viewing Fig. 18(b) , how level two and lower concepts in the hierarchy hide their siblings when highlighted opposed to collapsing them. Authentication is siblings with identification and authorization. However, as authentication has been highlighted in this instance, identification and authorization are hidden from view. This is done as a way of managing the complexity of a diagram and reducing the visual clutter when trying to view a specific concept and its children.
As mentioned earlier, when a modeler is familiar with the notation hierarchy, they will be able to work more efficiently when adding security requirements. However, it is unrealistic on our part to assume all users can only take advantage when familiar with the notation. Therefore, we included a button within the application which shows the ontology [4] when pressed. This way, users do not have to refer to external sources and they need reminding of a certain hierarchy or where a construct is located. The ontology within the application is shown in Fig. 19 .
For most constructs, specifying a link to an IoT element through parent/child links and holders is sufficient. However, there are some security concepts (e.g., separation of duty and binding of duty) which require linking to multiple IoT elements.
Within our application, we included this functionality through the use of modularization and the details toolbar. The modularization side was already implemented as discussed earlier in this section. The details toolbar contains the functionality to specify any other IoT elements the constructs require to linking. This was done by using a form-style dropdown menu. The menu takes each text/name value of every IoT element within the diagram then lists them for the user to choose from (assuming they have not already been linked, these elements are removed). This system can be seen in Fig. 20 .
Once a user links another IoT element, the link is visually represented by a line across the diagram. The only way that a user can access this functionality, however, is if the constructs themselves are visible on the screen. When the hierarchy is collapsed and binding of duty is hidden, the links are no longer visible. An example of how this looks within the application is shown in Fig. 21 .
VII. EVALUATION OF THE 3-D SECURITY EXTENSION
We evaluate our extension against the "Physics of Notations" identified by Moody [5] . It defines nine principles used for evaluating any notations to ensure that a scientific approach is kept in their assessment. These are design principles of notation not just for cyber security but also for any notations used in real world such as traffic signs. They are frequently used in the evaluation of modeling languages as well including that of BPMN [22] , [28] .
A. Semiotic Clarity
In this section, we discuss about the semiotic clarity of the notation. Although some extensions appear comprehensive to the cyber security domain, this is only relative to the construct deficit many of the others suffer from. In fairness to several extensions, they do explicitly specify their focus on a particular area of security and as such their paucity can be excused. Nevertheless, needing multiple extensions to specify requirements for the same domain is very poor usability and will likely lead to the extensions being dismissed altogether. In the proposed solution, semiotic clarity was guaranteed by ensuring every concept within our ontology has a respective construct within the notation.
B. Perceptual Discriminability
IoT and security notation are distinguishable instantly by the fact they are on different axes to each other. IoT is across the x-and z-axes, where security is across the x-,y-, and z-axes. All security notations are also encompassed by a shield shape, whereas no IoT element uses this shape.
As for the security notation itself, there are multiple factors that we have utilized to ensure the perceptual discriminability. Every construct is in a unique position. Each of the six key areas has a unique color and brightness dependent on hierarchy. All of the constructs have a unique icon, and finally, dual coding was used to label every construct in case all other variables fail.
C. Semantic Transparency
As for semantic transparency, we feel our notation falls somewhere between transparent and translucent. Some concepts such as firewall are very easily represented in a graphical form. Others such as public key infrastructure prove a lot more difficult. Nevertheless, we have created each icon with the intent of them being a mnemonic to their underlying semantics. As such, where a construct may not be semantically immediate, we believe with some definition and reasoning to how the icon was constructed, and the user will be able to make the connection themselves in very little time.
Of course, each construct is also labeled, so after a few uses of the extension, learnability alone will ensure the semantic transparency.
D. Complexity Management
Given that complexity management was one of the core motivations for this project, we are certain our application meets this requirement.
To manage complexity, we have split both notations (IoT and security) onto separate planes while still ensuring a relationship is maintained. We have also used modularization to seamlessly tier security hierarchies and stop cognitive overload from occurring. This functionality was also incorporated into the modeling tool itself, whereby the application will only display functionality to add children of the currently highlighted construct. The modularization also collapses and hides constructs from the view that are not within the current hierarchy.
Given that our approach of modeling security has allowed for the inclusion of around 80 new constructs to IoT notations without cognitive overload, it proves how well our tool manages complexity.
E. Cognitive Integration
Cognitive integration is a difficult principle to meet and in many ways requires a project such as this with a sole aim of solving it. In this instance, this is not something we addressed. As it is not incorporated into IoT itself, it is not something we prioritized to solve within this project.
F. Visual Expressiveness
As mentioned earlier in this paper, visual expressiveness was done very successfully within our notation. Horizontal and vertical positions were used to show hierarchy within the notation as well as to provide each construct a unique and identifiable location. Brightness and size (although the size was discreetly used) were then utilized to further iterate this hierarchy.
Color was used as a way of distinguishing between each of the six key areas as defined in our ontology. Shape was utilized for both the holder shape (shield) and the unique icon of each construct. Orientation most importantly was used a way of distinguishing IoT and security notation. Texture was the only variable this application did not utilize. By hitting seven of the possible eight visual variables, however, we are confident in stating our notation as being visually expressive.
G. Dual Coding
Dual coding, a relatively straightforward principle to achieve, is illustrated in Fig. 6 . Within each shield, we placed the name of the concept across the top.
H. Graphic Economy
Linking into the complexity management, graphic economy ensures notations do not reach exceedingly high numbers of constructs. Along with issues such as construct redundancy having a poor graphic economy can be overwhelming to a user, especially a novice [5] .
Given the method in which we allow access to our constructs, we believe that our notation has a good economy. If we had listed all of our constructs in a dropdown menu as most other tools do, our economy could be considered poor. Nevertheless, given that users are only ever subject to around six concepts or less at any given time, we are confident in stating this principle has been met.
I. Cognitive Fit
The cognitive fit is a principle we achieved by modularization of the security hierarchy, showing six concepts at the highest level acts as a mechanism for novice users to utilize the notation. As expertise and domain knowledge increase, users can then select one of these six and specify more specific concepts. Therefore, we consider the application to have four levels of cognitive fit, respective to the four tiers of each security hierarchy.
In summary, of Moody's nine principles, our extension satisfies eight. Although some still have room for improvement, we created our notation very much with these principles in mind and ensured that we were able to satisfy most of them.
J. Experiments and Results
As previously mentioned, we carried out experiments to evaluate our 3-D platform against conventional 2-D solutions in [20] . Participants were asked to implement the same tasks within the same time period in 2-D and 3-D environments, respectively. Their completion rate and accuracy were measured in comparison. Every other participant achieved a higher accuracy percentage when using the 3-D solution. Put into numbers, on average, participants improved their accuracy by 169.1% ± 69.33% when working in the 3-D environment compared to working in 2-D, although the margin of error is quite large in this instance. Even if we view the accuracy from a worst-case perspective in regard to this, the average participant still made a 100% accuracy improvement. The same can be said for the completion percentage, though not as substantially different, participants completed 21.05% ± 8.18% more of the 3-D diagram tasks compared with the 2-D diagram, as shown in Fig. 23 . 
VIII. RELATED WORK
There are some existing security extensions created for BPMN. We evaluate them by using the same principles defined by Moody [5] .
The security notation shown in Fig. 24 is the extension created by Rodriguez et al. [12] . The symbols from left to right represent nonrepudiation, attack harm detection, integrity, privacy, and access control. Perceptual discriminability has both strengths and weaknesses in this extension. The symbols are very distinct from the BPMN notation, separating their domain well from business processes. However, they are far too similar to each other, with only a few textual characters being the difference. Given that the distinguishing factor is text-making international use extremely difficult-this extension fails to adequately meet this principle.
The semantic transparency of the symbols is of a similar nature. A padlock successfully infers the meaning of security, but as all the concepts are represented by a padlock; without the use of text any further detail is impossible to distinguish, failing this principle. This leads onto the visual expressiveness of the symbols. There are eight visual variables which can be used to construct a notation, these being: horizontal position, vertical position, shape, brightness, size, orientation, color, and texture [5] . This extension is only utilizing one of the eight, which being shape. Very little potential has been taken the advantage of graphically.
The complexity management of this extension is nonexistent having adopted the method of stamping symbols onto BPMN elements. Where this may be an effective way of linking BPMN tasks and security concepts, diagrams quickly become overwhelmed when multiple concepts are placed on a single element. In [12] , the symbols are displayed on a BPMN diagram at their target size; when scaled, the text on each notation is very difficult to read. Given that text has been used as a primary notation, it is extremely a poor design, and when the symbols are displayed at a usable size, the text becomes nearly unreadable. Ideally, the text should only ever be used as a secondary notation to reiterate a semantic meaning. It has very poor cognitive effectiveness and provides very little discriminability between symbols [5] . However, as it has very much been used as a core distinguishing variable in this case, it is by far the biggest weakness of the design. Further appreciation of this fault can be found when viewing the notation from a non-English speaking perspective.
The dual coding principle states that text, more specifically words, should be used to complement graphics [5] . Correctly used text can be a useful tool for learning a notation. A novice user, for example, can keep referring to construct labels until they are confident enough using just visual aids. However, using acronyms adds more difficulty to this as novices must not only learn graphical symbols but these as well. In this instance, dual coding has not been satisfied.
The graphic economy of this notation is fairly successful. Nevertheless, as mentioned earlier, there are concept omissions within the extension. A notation with the poor graphic economy is more desirable than one with a construct deficit. As for cognitive integration and cognitive fit, this paper made no mention of any functionality to support either of these principles.
Saleem et al.'s slightly newer security extension [13] takes a different approach notation-wise but still yields several issues. In Fig. 25 (left-right) , the symbols represent confidentiality, integrity, and availability, and the core concepts of cyber security [29] .
In this case, the perceptual discriminability of the symbols was done rather successfully. Although similar in theme, each notation has several distinguishing variables that do not include text. This makes the unique identification from any culture or language very easy. The same can be said about semantic transparency. This extension has at least had some thought put into semiotics, creating a notation whose symbols perceptually resemble their semantic meaning. However, there are still some areas that allow for improvement. Take integrity, for example, color has been used as a primary notation to show an identical pattern both before and after a transmission, an appropriate visualization. A better option, however, would be to use shapes such as triangles and squares. Color is very useful in notations, as text should be a secondary notation and not a primary notation [5] . Some people can struggle to distinguish between certain colors, with the likes of blue and green being a prime example for people who suffer from tritanopia [30] , a variant of color blindness.
The visual expressiveness of these symbols appears much higher than that of Rodriguez et al. [12] with around three variables being used this time (color, texture, and shape). However, visual expressiveness refers to the idea that multiple variables should be used as a form of secondary notation. The only variable distinguishing these symbols is shape; color and texture are merely decoration. To better utilize color, for example, each symbol should have had its own unique one, e.g., red, blue, and green.
Complexity management is the same as with the previous extension. (Given the impact of this principle to visual notations, it is a wonder so few acknowledge it.) This paper that introduces this extension also provides a complete BPMN diagram incorporating the symbols. The notations again have very poor scalability, but not as bad as that of Rodriguez et al. [12] as there is a much higher perceptual discriminability in these symbols. Nonetheless, these symbols are not enclosed in a uniform shape as with the previous extension, when close together their boundaries become hard to see and they begin to corrupt each other. Fig. 25 shows that the principle of dual coding has not been met. The graphic economy is similar to that of the previous extension. Although it may be economical, the reason for it being construct deficit is a worse anomaly. As for cognitive fit and cognitive integration, they were also neglected by Saleem et al. [13] .
Salnitri et al.'s SecBPMN2 notation [11] can be seen in Fig. 26 . In Fig. 26 (left-right) , the concepts are as follows: integrity, authenticity, accountability, nonrepudiation, auditability, confidentiality, privacy, binding of duties, separation of duties, availability, and nondelegation.
The perceptual discriminability of these symbols is somewhat successful, but the visual distance between each symbol is dependent exclusively on shape. Nevertheless, as each symbol is clearly distinguishable from the others, the extension satisfies the principle. As for semantic transparency, these symbols fall somewhere in the semantically translucent range. They are not capable of semantic immediacy nor they are opaque. There has been some thought put into their design but there are still uncertainties as to their exact meaning, a weak satisfaction of the principle. The visual expressiveness of the symbols as touched on earlier is limited again; the only variable in use is shape. Some may argue that color has also been used, though, as mentioned earlier, this must be in the form of the secondary notation. Nevertheless, given that orange has been used consistently throughout all the symbols, separates this notation well from BPMN (which tends to be black and white or pale pastel colors).
The complexity management of this extension is rather poor. In Fig. 27 , it is easy to see how some users may feel in a state of cognitive overload. This is partially due to the dashed lines across the diagram; however, given that very few concepts have been used, it is easy to see how this extension can quickly overwhelm a diagram.
The remaining principles follow a similar theme as the previous extensions. The graphic economy is achieved through a construct deficit language, dual coding is not included, and cognitive fit and cognitive integration are altogether ignored.
Labda et al.'s security notation [31] can be seen in Fig. 28 . The symbols from the left to the right represent: access control (allow), access control (prevent), access control (limited), separation of tasks, binding of tasks, user consent, necessity to know (high), necessity to know (medium), and necessity to know (low).
The perceptual discriminability of this extension is difficult to determine. Each symbol is undoubtedly unique from the others but the three necessity-to-know constructs have little visual distance. There appears to have been an attempt at adhering to the principle of semantic transparency. Nevertheless, the symbols are borderlines between semantically opaque and perverse. For example, the concept of separation of tasks is represented by a lightning bolt, a strange choice of the mnemonic. Given that these symbols do not exactly infer their semantic, meaning it is difficult to conclude that semantic transparency has been met.
The visual expressiveness of the symbols is similar to the previous extensions. The only utilized variable is shape with Fig. 29 . Security notation of Koh and Zhou [9] . color once again acting as a weak secondary notation to separate the security notation from BPMN.
The complexity management of this extension is the same as Rodriguez et al. [12] , also using the symbol stamping method. As expected, similar themes emerge. To place the concepts on BPMN elements, they require scaling which once again makes perceptually discriminability difficult, especially given there is a visual distance of just one (shape). The graphic economy of this extension is controlled but this again is dependent on whether or not semiotic clarity was satisfied in the first instance. Cognitive fit and cognitive integration again are not acknowledged within this extension with dual coding clearly not included in Fig. 28 .
One of our previous notations [9] (Fig. 29) is similar to that of Salnitri et al. [11] but particularly with the aim of IoT devices. Both opting for a circular shape with some form of the icon inside. The underlying semantics for this notation are security task, authentication, access control, authorization, harm protection, encrypted message, non-repudiation, and secure communication, respectively, as shown in Fig. 29  (left-right) . The final three symbols represent confidentiality, integrity, and availability, with the stars visualizing the with the stars visualizing the required level for each concept.
Starting again with the perceptual discriminability of the notation, this extension has both positives and negatives. We used a padlock on each symbol as a way of identifying and separating them as security constructs. This is an effective way of separating the notation from BPMN. However, given that the general design is very similar to that of BPMN (black and white icons in circles), the notation is not as semantically immediate as it could be. Nevertheless, the use of padlocks and the icons inside each shape ensures the satisfaction of this principle (although there is room for improvement).
The semantic transparency of these symbols is similar to the notation of Labda et al. [31] . It is clear from the inspection of each element that thought has gone into making each symbol. However, some of the symbols are semantically perverse, for example, access control (third symbol along on the top row). This icon is the universal symbol for "shuffle mode" on audio devices. Although expert security users may have a different meaning, the majority of business and novice users will be more likely to associate this icon with "shuffle." A less generic icon should have been used.
The complexity management of this extension is a combination of symbol stamping and BPMN element replacement. By this we mean, rather than use a BPMN message event, one would use a security element encrypted message. However, we realized that this was a poor way to model security. Although business and security directly affect each other, readers do not always want or need to see both domains. Extensions should aim to be as nonintrusive as possible, allowing modelers the ability to remove (or hide) security requirements while still maintaining a complete business process (effectively a complexity management system on its own). A portion of a BPMN diagram can be seen in Fig. 30 demonstrating this extension in use. Fig. 30 emphasizes our previous point on how the notation is far too similar to BPMN. It is not as clear in Fig. 30 as in SecBPMN2 what is security and what is a business process. On further inspection, it will be able to identify eight security elements in use. Nevertheless, there has been no attempt at managing the extra complexity created by the extension once again failing this principle.
The visual expressiveness of this extension is rather poor, utilizing only one variable: shape. Confidentiality, integrity, and availability could be considered to use horizontal and vertical positions also as they seem to consistently appear on the top left of each diagram on the top left of each diagram. However, it is not explicitly defined whether this is a rule of the notation.
Dual coding is also neglected within this extension. None of the elements feature any supporting text, with confidentiality, integrity, and availability once again using letters as discriminable features. The graphic economy was not very impressive either, as the construct deficit is worse even with limited number of elements. As for cognitive fit and cognitive integration, these were also left out of this extension. For all the drawbacks we identified, it motivated us to look at the issue from the perspective of the third dimension.
From this review, of the five extensions evaluated not one extension is capable of satisfying even half of Moody's principles. Moody [5] discussed how there are tradeoffs among the principles and satisfying one may have a negative effect on another. Nevertheless, certain principles such as complexity management should always be achieved, especially in software engineering [5] . In contrast, our security extension proposed in this paper is not only comprehensive to the domain but can also satisfy the most optimal number of principles.
IX. CONCLUSION
Security is one of the key problems, which needs to be addressed before the wide application of IoT devices. The deep engagement of smart devices into our daily lives means that an SIoT environment comprises interactions between both humans and things. While benefiting from the convenience it brought to us, the security issue could have an even bigger impact and more severe consequences on our society [32] , [33] . Understanding the security issue requires us to first capture and model the security requirements in such a dynamic environment.
In this paper, we explored the possibility to use BPMN to represent SIoT scenarios. The nature of the business process, which contains both automatic service task and manual user task means BPMN, is capable of capturing both the technical and social aspects of the SIoT environment. Based on this, we proposed to use the third dimension to model the security requirements. Unlike traditional 2-D-based solutions, which suffer from the complexity management issue, our solution separates the security notations from the IoT diagram in different dimensions thus makes it much easier to manage for even nonsecurity experts. We designed the new 3-D security extensions by following the design principles outlined by Moody [5] for notations. It is comprehensive (supported by our ontology) and proving to be capable of satisfying the most number of these principles.
A complete framework for our notation (both symbolic and visual representation) was detailed with an explicit note on how we achieve the complexity management (among other principles). We then discussed how we implemented our proposed notation within a game engine focusing specifically on the functionality we created to ensure the complexity management and usability.
As these principles are only a theoretical evaluation, in our future works, we plan to test the application with real users. Similarly, we can assess the application from a usability perspective as well as gauging the potential adoption of the application within an industry SIoT environment.
